



Lecture Title: China Embraces the World [中国は世界を受け入れます]: Deng Xiaoping's Economic Reforms [経済改革] (1978 – 1989)

- **Deng Xiaoping** (鄧小平 -とう しょうへい) became the top leader of the PRC [中華人民共和国] in 1978. Deng was one of China's longest serving political elites [中国共産党の古参の方] ever since the establishment of the **Communist Party of China (CCP)** (中国共産党の設立した時から) in the early 1920s [see photo of Mao Zedong's funeral (毛沢東の葬式) in 1976].
- Deng had also experienced **first-hand** (じかに) the dangers of **radicalism** (急進主義の危険性) and the negative effects [否定的な影響] of an **intransigent adherence** (妥協しない順守) to ideology rather than **pragmatism** (実地的な考え方 / 実用主義よりもむしろイデオロギー).
- When Zhou Enlai (周恩来 - しゅう おんらい) died in January 1976, Deng's support base [支持基盤] was weakened, and the **Gang of Four** [四人組] (led by Mao's wife, **Jiang Qing** [江清 - こう せい] organised a purge [政治的な粛清] aimed at removing Deng from the centre of power [政治権力の中心から鄧小平を除去するために].
- Deng however survived this purge [政治的な粛清は成功しませんでした], and when Mao [毛沢東] died in September 1976, Jiang Qing [江清] and her supporters were politically isolated [政治的に孤立した]. In October 1976, the Gang of Four were **ousted** [四人組は追い出されました / 失脚された] in a coup d'état [クーデター] (see doctored funeral photo -毛沢東の葬式について変えられた写真).
- Within a few weeks, Deng was the **de-facto** leader of communist China [中華人民共和国の事実上の指導者になった]. In 1978, Deng **brushed aside** [押し退けた] the less influential [鄧小平より影響力がない] and less **charismatic** [カリスマ的じゃない指導者] **Hua Guofeng** [華国鋒] (whom Mao had **nominated** [任じられた] as his **successor** [後継]).



- From 1978 until his retirement (退職) in 1992, Deng was the 'paramount leader' (最高指導者) of the country.
- Deng and his reformist supporters' objective (改革派のサポーターの目的) was to secure the rapid (急な) but realistic (現実的な) industrialisation (産業化) of China, and to ensure (確保する) the country's economic development and progress [経済発展と進展] via (経由) an opening of the Chinese economy to the outside world [1978年に中国は経済政策を大きく転換し、いわゆる「改革開放政策」を採用した].
- Moderate and pragmatic [穏健派と实际的な] Chinese political elites felt that valuable and painful lessons [/ 痛みを伴う教訓/ 貴重な教訓 /有益な教訓を得た] had been learnt by the failure of campaigns [キャンペーンの失敗] such as the disastrous [壊滅的な] Great Leap Forward [大躍進] (1958 to 1961) and the turmoil [混乱] and instability [政情不安定.] caused by the Cultural Revolution [文化大革命] (1966 to 1976). [See Deng Xiaoping era slogan [スローガン] - 「事実から真実を追求する」]
- Deng Xiaoping's [鄧小平] pragmatic attitude [実用主義的である] towards economic reform [経済改革] (even though he still was opposed to hurried [スピーディ] or major political liberalisation [大きな政治的自由化]) was arguably [おそらく] best illustrated (例えられた) in a speech he made at the Guangzhou conference in 1961 [1961年の広州会議], when he said '*It doesn't matter whether it is a white cat or a black cat, a cat that catches mice is a good cat.*' [白ネコであれ, 黒ネコであれ, ネズミを捕るのはよいネコだ].



- While Mao and his supporters [毛沢東と彼の支持者] prioritized **class struggle** (階級闘争を優先した) and **socialism** (社会主義), Deng and other reformers [鄧小平と他の改革派のサポーター] believed that domestic political stability and economic development [国内政情安定と経済発展] should be China's most important objective [最も重要な目的] [see photo from the Cultural Revolution [文化大革命] (1966 – 1976)].
- Deng was a committed communist [忠実な共産主義者] and thus did not reject socialism [社会主義を拒絶しませんでした] but he proposed a middle ground [妥協点] between a **market economy** [市場経済] and a political system that was still faithful to [に忠実である] **Marxist-Leninist** principles [マルクス・レーニン主義の原則] (Note the phrase - '**socialism with Chinese characteristics**' [中国の特色のある社会主義]) [see quotes - 引用 - 1) 改革は中国の2回目の革命です, 2 - 'Poverty is not socialism' 貧困は社会主義ではありません].
- Deng and his supporters **longed for** (憧れた) the day when China could return to its historical position as a leading global economic, military, and political power [中国が主要な全世界の経済で、軍で、政治的な大国としてその歴史上の位置に戻ることができた日を、トンと彼の支持者は待ち望みました。].
- Communist party **traditionalists** [伝統主義者] and **hard-line ideologues** [強硬なイデオログ] within the PRC [中華人民共和国] however worried that major economic reforms and opening up [改革開放政策] could leave China **vulnerable** to **exploitation** [搾取に対して脆弱] by foreign countries as had happened during the 'Century of Humiliation' (1839 – 1949) [民族的な屈辱の世紀] (see top picture on Page 4) .



Reform is
China's second
revolution.
Deng Xiaoping

meetville.com

Poverty is not
socialism. To
be rich is
glorious.
Deng Xiaoping

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- One of Deng's most immediate objectives [最も差し迫った目的] after coming to power [権力を握ったあと] in 1976-78 was to repair the economic and reputational damage [経済と国のイメージを改善すること] and political instability [政治不安] caused by the Cultural Revolution [文化大革命].
- The communist party leadership [共産党指導部] was determined that China should achieve modernization [成功すると固く決心していました] in the fields of i) agriculture [農業], ii) industry [産業], iii) science and technology [理工], and iv) defense [国防]. This objective is referred to as the 'Four Modernizations' [四つの現代化という, 中国における国家改革] [See photo of Deng's visit to the Johnson Space Center in the USA (テキサス州ヒューストンにあるジョンソン宇宙センター) in 1979].
- Under the new system, poor Chinese peasants [貧しい中国の農民] were given control and ownership [支配と所有] of their own crops [収穫], were given more money for food quotas [政府食糧生産目標] they fulfilled [到達した], and could lease (借り上げる) land from those collectives [共同農場] still under the administration of the government [政府の管理下に].
- After the peasants [農民] had achieved their quotas [政府食糧生産目標] for the government, the peasantry [農民] could then sell any surplus food [余剰食品] in legal free markets [法的に自由市場]. Therefore more money was available [以前より多くのお金を利用できました] for them to spend and there was a greater incentive [動機] to work hard and to produce more [勤勉への刺激[動機]] [see photo of an excited young couple buying a TV].





- The communist leadership [共産党指導部] also decided to accept **foreign direct investment (FDI)** [外国直接投資], foreign loans, and foreign assistance. They also allowed the **evolution** [開発] of a private non-state enterprise sector [民間の非国営企業部門].
- Another positive initiative [先手] was the creation of **'Special Economic Zones' (SEZs)** [中国において最初の経済特区] since 1980 in five coastal areas and cities. In these SEZs [see map], the Beijing government allowed the establishment of free market export-orientated economies [北京は自由市場の輸出志向の経済の確立を許可した].
- With the huge and potentially extremely valuable Chinese market place [潜在的に非常に貴重な市場] open to the world for business, billions [十億] of US dollars and other foreign currencies [他の外国通貨] flowed into [流れた] China.
- Foreign investors [投資家] and companies **flocked** [群れた] to the PRC [中華人民共和国] hoping to **capitalize** [乗じる] on its massive market [大規模な市場], immense population [広大な人口], and enormous low-wage and **non-unionized** work force [膨大な低賃金と非組合労働者] [see map].



- Following the examples of East Asia's wealthiest economies (日本とアジアの四小龍), Deng placed a high priority (最優先) in developing positive relations (良い関係を築くこと) with the United States [see photo of Deng [鄧小平] and US President Carter [ジミー・カーター 米大統領] signing the 'Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations' (中華人民共和國とアメリカ合衆国の外交関係樹立に関する共同コミュニケ) in January 1979].
- American investment [アメリカの投資], aid [援助], and goodwill [善意] played a huge role in [主要な役割を果たす] reform era China's rise and economic development [改革の時代の中国の台頭と経済発展]. The US marketplace [市場], the largest in the world, became the **principal** destination [最も重要な目的地] for Chinese goods and products [中国の商品] as the PRC's export sector [輸出セクター] increased dramatically (劇的に増加しました) in the years after the late 1970s [see photo of the 'Pudong New Area' [浦東区] in Shanghai, a Special Economic Zone (経済特区) in 1992 and then in 2009].
- The importance of positive US-China relations [米国と中国の良い関係] could be seen in the export statistics [輸出の統計値] with as much as one third of all Chinese exports [すべての中国の輸出の3分の1] going to the United States.



- As Cohen notes: ‘China’s economic growth (中国経済の成長) and the speed with which it became a major trading country and an important participant [主要な貿易国であり、重要な参加国となった。] in international capital markets [国際資本市場] was extraordinary [素晴らしかった]. Its nine per cent rate of growth (9パーセントの成長率) in gross national product [国民総生産] for the years 1978 to 1993 was the fastest of any country in the world Despite continued low *per capita* [一人当たりの所得は低い] income, the gross national product of China’s billion [十億 or 1000 million] people overtook [追い越した] that of Germany, placing China third in the world behind the United States and Japan (中国は世界の中でアメリカと日本の次の第三番目の経済大国となった (Cohen, 2000:444). Many analysts [多くの分析者] predicted [予測した] it would have the world’s largest economy by the middle of the twenty-first century. (21世紀の半ばには、中国は世界で最も大きな経済大国になると) Its international two-way trade [双方向貿易] soared [舞い上がりました] from less than \$15 billion (15億ドル) in 1977 to more than \$115 billion (115億ドル) in 1990 and nearly \$200 billion (200億ドル) by 1993.... And its people were eating far better than they had in Mao’s day’ (Cohen, 2000:444).
- From the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s, the income [所得] of urban residents [都市住民] had increased by 14.1% and the income of rural residents [農村住民] has increased by 11%, reflecting a significant improvement [改善] in the standard of living [生活水準] for communist China’s citizens [国民] [see graph and bar chart].



- The fastest growing group in the PRC [中華人民共和国でもっとも速く成長しているグループ] since the late 1970s has been the urban **middle class** [都市部の中産階級] (80 million [8000万人] or 6.15% of the total population in 2007), which has played a major role [役割は大きい] in increasing consumer spending [消費者支出] by acquiring [取得する] the symbols of middle class life [中産階級の生活のシンボル / 中産階級の一員のシンボル] such as modern city apartments, a university education, books and newspapers, foreign holidays [海外の旅行], cars, televisions, **and so forth** [など] [see chart].
- In the years from 1981 to 2005, the percentage of the PRC's population [中華人民共和国の人口の百分率] who lived on less than one US dollar (\$1) decreased from 85% to 15% [1日1ドル以下で生活していた人は85%から15%に減少した]. This meant that about 600 million [6億] Chinese citizens were lifted out of **poverty** [6億人の中国の市民は貧困から救い出されました / 貧困から持ち上げた] as a result of the economic changes [経済的変化の結果として] created by the **reform and opening up** era [改革開放政策] [*“live below the poverty line”* = 最低の貧困生活を送る].
- Divisions [分裂] within China however (within the political elite between conservatives [保守派], party ideologists [コミュニスト観念論者], and reformers [改革者] and also at the street level) meant that Deng had to proceed slowly [ゆっくり進み] and carefully through uncertain and unprecedented changes [不確かと前例のない変化] for China. The PRC leader [鄧小平] famously referred [言い及びました] to this challenge as *“crossing the river by feeling for stones”* 「川底を確かめつつ渡河する」 during his famous southern tour [鄧小平の中国南部のツアー] of China in 1992.

Class divisions


Composition of China's workforce, %

	1952	1978	1988	1999
Administrators/managers	0.6	1.2	2.2	3.6
Owners of private enterprises*	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.6
Owners of private enterprises†	4.1	0.0	3.1	4.2
Technicians/specialists	0.9	3.5	4.8	5.1
Office workers	0.5	1.3	1.7	4.8
Business/service workers	3.1	2.2	6.4	12.0
Manufacturing workers	6.4	19.8	22.4	22.6
Agricultural workers	84.2	67.4	55.8	44.0
Unemployed/underemployed	n/a	4.6	3.6	3.1

Source: "Report on a study of contemporary China's social strata", January 2002
 *Eight or more employees †Fewer than eight employees




Forecast for air pollution in and around China

Very serious  Not serious

Note: Forecast for airborne pollution particles as of noon on Feb. 1. Provided by Toshihiko Takemura, associate professor at Kyushu University's Research Institute for Applied Mechanics

- There have also been numerous problems related to China's economic rise [中国の台頭と経済発展] and prosperity [繁栄].
- Major issues [主要な問題] include **rampant corruption** [汚職が横行する] and environmental pollution [see map] and **degradation** [環境汚染と劣化] [See photo on Page 10 of an elderly Chinese man [年嵩の人] wearing a facemask [フェイスマスク] near Beijing's Forbidden City [紫禁城] on a smoggy evening (スモッグのある晩).
- Rapid economic development [急速な経済発展] has placed a heavy strain [需要過多 / 多大な負担] on the availability [可用性] of natural resources [天然資源] such as oil, gas, and water.
- Many people fear that the economy is **over-heating** [過熱している] and that China's **property boom** [不動産ブーム] will soon end and result in a **property bust** [財産バスト] and then economic recession [景気後退].
- There was also a very apparent [一目瞭然] '**income gap**' [所得格差] and income **inequality** [不平等] between people who live in the cities of China, particularly along the east coast [東海岸], and those who continue to live in the countryside [田舎] [see GDP (国内総生産) map].



- The traditional social securities [社会保障給付] of the communist system [共産主義体制下の社会] in the years before the reform period (before 1978 – 1978の前の改革の時代) were also threatened and challenged [弱体化された], for example the traditional guarantee of life-time employment [終身雇用の保証] (see ‘social security’ picture).


Key Points:

- The deaths of Chairman Mao Zedong [毛沢東] (1893-1976) and Premier Zhou Enlai [周恩来] (1898-1976), as well as the downfall [没落] of the ‘Gang of Four’ [四人組] marked the end of the Cultural Revolution [文化大革命] (1966-1976) and a very **turbulent** [不穏な] ‘ideological’ [イデオロギーの] period in domestic Chinese politics [中国国内の政治].
- By the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping had become the ‘paramount leader’ [最高指導者] of the PRC [中華人民共和国]. His leadership and economic reforms [経済改革] introduced a period of unprecedented economic growth [未曾有の経済成長] in China. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [国内総生産] from 1978 onwards grew by 10% per year. This economic change had a major influence [大きな影響] on the **make-up** [肌合い] of Chinese society and on China’s global power and influence [中国の世界的大国と影響] by the late 1980s [see illustration].

IN NEED OF SOCIAL SECURITY



- In 2011, an urban Chinese earned 5.2 times as much as a rural resident.
- The urban-rural income gap last year was 68 per cent higher than in 1985
- 691 million urban population exceeded rural population for first time in history last year
- 500 million more rural residents estimated to move to cities in next 20 years, requiring US\$ 794 billion social spending



- Pragmatic economic growth and development [実質的な経済発展] were the priority objectives [優先の目的] for Deng [鄧小平] and his reformist supporters [改革派支持者]. Communist ideology was **toned down** [あまり強調されなくなった / 共産主義のイデオロギーは和らげられました] in favour of prosperity [繁栄] and the raising of living standards [生活水準の引き上げること].
- Deng [鄧小平] looked to the experience of China's wealthy neighbours [日本とアジアの四小龍] in their processes of economic reform [経済改革のプロセス]. Success in the economic field was not seen as being necessarily **conditional** upon major political reform [民主化と自由化は経済成功のために必要でない].
- Friendly relations [親善を保つ] with Western powers [西大国] were also viewed as helpful [役に立つ] in terms of economic growth and stability [経済成長と安定性]. Positive relations lasted [保ちました] until **the Tiananmen Massacre** [六四天安門事件 – see photo] of June 1989. Beijing refused to allow major political reforms [主要な政治改革].
- China's additional wealth and interests as well as the decline [減少] in the Soviet threat [ソ連の脅威] on the PRC's western borders [西部国境] witnessed a shift [転向] in defence strategy [防衛戦略] toward the east and maritime areas [海域]. By the late 1980s, Beijing controversially approved [論争的に承認した] extra spending toward improving China's armed forces [国軍], especially the navy [海軍] [see photo].



Crowded Waters

China put its first aircraft carrier into service, part of ambitions to challenge the naval dynamic in the Pacific. Selected naval ships in the region, by country:

China	270 (one aircraft carrier)
North Korea	73
Japan	67 (one aircraft carrier)
South Korea	42
Taiwan	30
Russia (Pacific Fleet)	26
Australia	18
U.S. (Seventh Fleet)*	13 (one aircraft carrier)

*Forward-deployed forces only; Notes: ship counts are estimates and for 2011, except for China which is for 2012; does not include ballistic-missile submarines. Sources: U.S. Department of Defense (China); International Institute of Strategic Studies (all others)



President Hu Jintao commissions the Liaoning aircraft carrier Tuesday.