


**Lecture Title: Mao's China [毛沢東の中国],
Taiwan and the Sino-Soviet Split [中ソ対立]**

Taiwan

- By 1953, the US was Taiwan's most powerful ally (最も強大な同盟国), and was, from Chairman Mao Zedong's **perspective** (議長毛沢東の視点から), the number one obstacle [一番の障害] to the complete **re-unification** (再統一) of the Chinese **motherland** (母国) and a **conclusive** end (決定的な終わり) to the civil war [国共内戦] and the 'Century of Humiliation' [屈辱の世紀] (1839 - 1949) [see maps].
- Mao Zedong [毛沢東] decided to **trigger** a crisis (危機を起こすこと) in the Taiwan Strait (台湾海峡) in order to strengthen the PRC's position vis-à-vis Taiwan (台湾と比較して中国を強化するために), and to **intimidate** (脅す) the US and Taiwan (米国と台湾を脅迫すること) into not signing a defense treaty (防御条約に調印しないこと).
- In September 1954, the **People's Liberation Army (PLA)** [人民解放軍という中国の軍事組織] began firing **artillery shells** (大砲の砲弾) upon KMT-controlled islands (中国国民党によって支配される島) in the Taiwan Strait [台湾海峡]. The PLA's strategy (人民解放軍の戦略) however was unsuccessful. [台湾海峡危機(たいわんかいきょうきき)は1950年代から1960年代にかけて中華人民共和国(中国大陸)と中華民国(台湾)の間での軍事的緊張が高まった事件の総称。]
- At that time, Beijing did not diplomatically recognize Taipei [北京は台北を外交的に認めませんでした] and vice versa [逆もまた同様]. Taipei [台北] however viewed itself as the only legitimate government for all of China [中国全土のための唯一の合法政府].



- Due to US diplomatic support (アメリカの外交的な支持の結果), China's seat in the United Nations (UN) [中国の国連の席] and on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (国連安全保障理事会), was occupied by Taiwan from 1945 until 1971 [台湾は国連で中国のすべてを代表しました].
- The Soviet Union (ソビエト連邦) was China's most powerful ally (中国最も強大な同盟国) and by 1957, Mao also felt confident (毛沢東は自信があった) that the rise of Soviet military power (ソビエト軍勢力の高まり) as well as initial Soviet superiority (初期の優越) in the Space Race [宇宙開発競争] (1957 – 1975) could deter an effective US response (米国の効果的な反応を阻止できること) to a second attack on Taiwan (軍事攻撃).
- In August 1958, the PLA [人民解放軍] bombed islands off the Chinese coast (see the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958) [金門砲戦(きんもんほうせん)は、1958年8月23日から10月5日にかけて、中華民国の金門島に対し、中華人民共和国の中国人民解放軍が同島に侵攻すべく砲撃を行ったことにより起きた戦闘である。中華民国では八二三砲戦と称している。また「第2次台湾海峡危機」と称されることもある] [see map].
- Once again, Beijing (北京) was surprised by the American response [北京はアメリカの反応に驚いた]. Almost immediately (すぐに), Washington (ワシントン) sent its air and naval forces (アメリカの海軍空軍) to assist KMT forces (国民党軍隊) [see photo of US fighter jet (アメリカのジェット戦闘機) flying over the Taiwan Strait (台湾海峡) in 1958].
- Beijing (北京) expected (予想した) the Soviet Union (ソビエト連邦) to assist the Chinese military (人民解放軍). Moscow (モスクワ) however refused to become involved (かかわることに躊躇する) in a potential conflict (潜在的な戦争). Beijing once again had no choice (選択肢がない) but to pull the PLA back (人民解放軍を引き戻した)



The Sino-Soviet Split [中ソ対立] (1960 – 1989)

中ソ対立(ちゅうそたいりつ)とは、1960年代から表面化した中華人民共和国とソビエト連邦の対立状態である。

- The Chinese **resented** [憤慨した] the **terms** (条件) of Moscow's economic and technical assistance (ソビエト連邦の技術支援) to the PRC [中華人民共和国]. A notable example [有名な例] was the Soviet demand that the Chinese pay [金を要求した] for help and materiel (資材) provided to PRC military forces [人民解放軍] during the Korean War (1950 – 1953) [朝鮮戦争] [See Sino-Soviet Friendship Poster: “Study the Soviet Union’s vanguard experience in production. Strive to industrialize our motherland.”].
- By the late 1950s [1950年代後半], Mao [毛沢東] and senior **Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres** [中国共産党の幹部] believed that the USSR’s foreign policy (ソビエト連邦の外交政策) towards the United States as too moderate [穏やかである、あるいは穏健に行われる方針] and non-revolutionary [非革命的な方針]. Note for example, the Soviet policy [ソビエト連邦の方針] of ‘Peaceful Co-existence’ [平和共存 (Peaceful coexistence)]とは、冷戦期に示された考え方の一つであり、資本主義陣営に属する国家と共産主義陣営に属する国家は共存しうるとするもの。]
- Nikita Khrushchev [ニキータ・フルシチョフ - ソビエト連邦の第4代最高指導者] also tried to persuade (説得する) Mao [毛沢東] to accept the US-supported [米国に指示された方針] ‘two Chinas’ policy [二国論] in relation to Taiwan.
- From the late 1950s onwards [1950年代後半以降], Sino-Soviet relations (中国-ソビエト関係) began to publicly and rapidly **deteriorate** (急激に悪化していった / 公の議論をした) [see picture of Soviet [ソビエト] and Chinese soldiers fighting in 1969 – (see ‘Sino-Soviet Border Dispute’ - 中ソ国境紛争)].



China's Domestic Problems (中国の国内問題)

- In the early 1960s, the PRC [中華人民共和国] had very negative relations [非常に否定的な関係] with the USA, the USSR [ソビエト連邦], and India (note also the Sino-Indian War of 1962 - 中印国境紛争).
- After the establishment of the PRC in 1949 (1949年に中華人民共和国の設立の後), the communist party leadership (共産党のリーダーシップ) started a program of reform (改革のプログラム) in a number of important areas including **land reform** (農地改革), and the development of heavy industry (重工業の発達) [中国では、1949 年の共産革命 を経て計画経済が導入された上、私有財産が全面的に否定され、利潤を追求するための生産と交換も禁じられた] (see photo of a village tribunal [村裁判所] with a kneeling landowner [跪いている地主]).
- Beijing (北京) **adopted** (採用した) the Soviet model of economic development for the PRC's economy (see 'Mao's [毛沢東] Attempts to Change China') [ソ連を手本にして国の経済的構造を作る].
- By 1956, more communist party members (共産党メンバー) had become **disillusioned** with Mao's reform program (毛沢東の改革のプログラムの結果に幻滅した.). Mao therefore launched the so-called '**Hundred Flowers**' campaign [百花斉放], which gave **intellectuals** (知識) and other **citizens** (国民) the opportunity to **criticize** (中国共産党を批判できること) the Party, **ostensibly** (表向き) for the purpose of learning from their **criticism** (批判から学ぶ目的で), and therefore making China stronger. [百花斉放百家争鳴とは、1956年から1957年に中華人民共和国で行われた政治運動。]



Mao's Attempts to Change China

Mao's Programs	Program Results
First Five-Year Plan 1953–1957	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industry grew 15 percent a year. • Agricultural output grew very slowly.
Great Leap Forward 1958–1961	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • China suffered economic disaster—industrial declines and food shortages. • Mao lost influence.
Cultural Revolution 1966–1976	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mao regained influence by backing radicals. • Purges and conflicts among leaders created economic, social, and political chaos.

- Unexpectedly [予想外に], many Chinese intellectuals severely criticized the government (中国の知識人は毛沢東の政府をひどく非難しました)
- Thousands of intellectuals (何千もの知識人) and other citizens were labeled (標識された) as 'rightists' (右傾) and severely punished (厳罰に処せられた) with jail sentences (牢屋に入って刑に服する) in prison labor camps [刑務所または強制労働所で時間を過ごす] (for re-education programs [再教育プログラム]) and in some cases [時としては], death (死刑) [see photo of an arrest [逮捕する] of suspected "rightist" [「右派」容疑者] during the anti-rightist movement (反右派の運動 / 右派弾圧) [1957 to 1959]].
- Chairman Mao [毛沢東主席], took advantage of (搾り取った / 付け込んだ / だました) the 'Hundred Flowers' [1956-1957] (百花齊放 / 百花齊放百家争鳴) and the 'Anti-Rightist Movement' [1957 to 1959] (反右派の運動 / 右派弾圧) campaigns to punish (罰すること) and imprison (監獄に入れる) hundreds of thousands of people [50万人以上の人々] and potential anti-government dissidents (潜在的な反政府の反体制派) [(see cartoon)].



THE HUNDRED FLOWERS CAMPAIGN 1956-57



By W. A. Boyce

The 'Great Leap Forward' [大躍進] (1958 – 1961)

中華人民共和国が施行した農業・工業の大増産政策である。毛沢東は数年間で経済的にアメリカ合衆国・イギリスを追い越すことを夢見て実施した。結果は推計2,000万人から5,000万人の餓死者を出す大失敗に終わり。

- The 'Great Leap Forward' [大躍進] was a highly ambitious [極めて野心的な] economic policy [非常に野心的な経済政策] focused on achieving rapid advancement [急速な発展] in agricultural and industrial production through the **mobilization** [動員] of China's people [see 1958 propaganda poster – “Go all out and aim high. The East leaps forward, the West is worried”].
- The campaign demanded the **abolition** [廃止] of private land **holdings** (民間の土地保有), and the creation of massive state-controlled (政府に制御された土地) agricultural **communes** or **collectives** (大規模な農業コミュニン / 農地の集団農場化). The abolition [廃止] of private land holdings was very unpopular [非常に不人気] and had a devastating effect [壊滅的な影響] on the ability of poor Chinese peasants [農民] to avoid **starvation** (飢餓 / 飢えをしのぐ).
- As a result of the campaign (キャンペーンの結果として), hundreds of millions of rural Chinese peasants (何億もの中国の農民) had nothing to rent, sell, or to use as **collateral** (金融資産担保) with which to secure a loan from a bank (融資を確保する).
- In addition, millions of **backyard furnaces** (何百万もの裏庭炉) were built, and ordinary **unskilled** (未熟な) Chinese people spent many hours collecting and **melting down** (溶かす) **scrap** iron and steel (古鉄とスクラップ鉄鋼を集めて、溶解すること) to increase China's iron and steel production levels (鉄鋼生産レベル).



- Any available wood and timber [どんな利用できる木と材木] was collected to fuel the furnaces (裏庭炉の燃料を供給するために). As a result (その結果として), many areas of China suffered environmental damage [環境破壊] such as **drought** (干ばつ) and **erosion** (浸食) due to a lack of trees (**deforestation** [森林伐採]). The quality of the backyard furnace (裏庭炉) iron and steel was too poor (質の悪い鉄鋼) and therefore could not be used [使われることができませんでした].
- In addition, Beijing demanded that Chinese peasants produce more and more grain (中国の農民から北京はさらに多くの穀物を要求した) in order to provide food to the country's urban population [食物を国の都会に住む住民に提供するために] and to add money to the PRC's **treasury** (中華人民共和国の国庫に属する現金) via the export of grain (穀物の輸出を通して).
- As a consequence (その結果として), the communist party (中国共産党) placed **crippling** demands (物事を人に)何でも依頼しすぎる) on the rural poor (農民) who had to work **excessive** (過大な) hours [過度の時間を働かせなければなりません] in a **vain** attempt (無駄な試み) to reach unrealistic iron, steel, and grain targets (非現実的な産出目標) (see top right of page).
- Harvests** (収穫) were also left uncollected (収集されなかった) or left to **rot** (腐り始めた) [note false propaganda photo -虚偽の宣伝の写真].
- Exorbitant** grain targets (法外な産出目標) and local communist party officials (地元の共産党当局) who exaggerated the production levels (生産レベルを誇張した) meant that nearly all of the grain was sent to the cities [穀物のほぼ全ては、都市に送られました]. The peasants (農民) therefore had **insufficient** amounts of food (不十分な量の食物).



- This food shortage (食糧不足) was made worse by a devastating (破壊的な) **locust swarm** (イナゴの群れ) [see photo of the anti-sparrow (反スズメ) 'Four Pests' (四害駆除運動 / 四害を退治します) campaign].
- As a consequence of the **dire** food shortages (大躍進の悲惨な食糧不足の結果として) caused by the 'Great Leap Forward' (大躍進), between fifteen and forty-five million Chinese died of famine and starvation [15～45,000,000の中国人は、飢饉と飢餓で死にました] (the '**Great Chinese Famine**' [中国の大飢饉] from 1958 to 1961) (see photo of a famine victim -飢饉犠牲者).

The Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976) [文化大革命という政治的社会的改革運動]

- Mao initiated (始めた) the '**Cultural Revolution**' [文化大革命] (1966 – 1976) in an attempt to restore (復元する) popular support (大衆の支持) for his leadership and to undermine (覆す) potential challengers (潜在的挑戦者を弱らせることために) after the serious policy failures [方針の深刻な失敗] of the 1950s.
- The Cultural Revolution (文化大革命) was a mass social campaign (大規模な社会的なキャンペーン) in which Mao and his supporters tried to **rekindle** (再び火がつくこと) revolutionary **fervor** (革命的な情熱) and to '**purify**' the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] (中国の共産党を浄化すること).



- Mao (毛沢東) and his supporters took advantage of (搾り取った / 付け込んだ / だました) the anger aroused (刺激された怒り) by the Cultural Revolution [文化大革命] to humiliate (恥をかかせること / 凹ます), to punish (罰する), and to **purge** (肅清する) CCP members (共産党メンバー) and Chinese intellectuals (知識階級) who were regarded as potential threats (可能性の脅威) to Chairman Mao's power (毛沢東主席).
- They also promoted **a cult of personality** (個人崇拜) centered on Mao [毛沢東].
- A top party elite [共産党幹部] Liu Shaoqi [劉少奇] [see in photo of Liu and Red Guards (紅衛兵)] for example was labeled (標識された) a 'capitalist-roader' (資本主義ローダー) and a traitor (国賊) to China while Deng Xiaoping [鄧小平] was forced to retire [強制的に隠居させられた] and his son tortured (拷問された) and left permanently disabled (廃疾となった) by Red Guards (紅衛兵) [紅衛兵(こうえいへい)は、中華人民共和国の文化大革命時期に台頭した全国的な青年学生運動。].
- Millions of people were imprisoned (数百万人は収監されました / 投獄された) and forced to participate in re-education programs (再教育プログラム) while tens of thousands of others [何万人] were executed (殺害された) by Mao's [毛沢東] supporters [see photo of a suspected 'rightist' ([「右派」容疑者]) victim in the 'airplane' position].
- Noting the terrible damage [否定的な影響] to China's image (中国の評判) and stability (国内の安定性) caused by the 'Cultural Revolution [文化大革命]', Cohen observes 'China's young, **goaded** [追い立てた] by Mao [毛沢東] and his allies, attacked their parents, their teachers, and Party officials [共産党メンバー], beating thousands to death [殴打致死] and driving thousands more to suicide [自殺に追いやる].... 'The Cultural Revolution brought China's economic development [経済発展] to a **halt** [終わらせる / 停留] 'By mid-1967 China was in **chaos** [混沌], with **pitched battles** [激戦] between various revolutionary **factions** [革命的な派閥], (Cohen, 2000:410).




United States-China Rapprochement (友好関係樹立 / 和解)

- By 1970, Chairman Mao (毛沢東主席) realized (気が付いた) that the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命) was becoming a threat to his own power (毛沢東に対する脅威になった) and that domestic events could become uncontrollable (制御できない).
- The Chinese leader also realized (気が付いた) that the USSR [ソビエト連邦] was the greatest threat (最も大きな脅威) to the PRC's national security (中華人民共和国の国家の安全保障) [note the 'Sino-Soviet Border Dispute' - 中ソ国境紛争) in 1969].
- Mao [毛沢東] and his supporters therefore concluded that rapprochement (友好関係樹立 / 和解) with Washington (ワシントン) might strengthen China's position [中国の位置を強化するかもしれません] vis-à-vis (向かい合って) the Soviet Union (ソビエト連邦) [see photo of Mao (毛沢東) and US President Richard Nixon [リチャード・ニクソン米大統領] meeting in China in February 1972].
- The US also realized (気が付いた) that Beijing (北京) could be very useful (とても重宝する) in helping to end the Vietnam War [ベトナム戦争 (1954-75)] and in convincing (納得させる) its allies (同盟国), the Vietnamese communists [ベトナムの共産主義者], to agree to a settlement (和解に同意すること) that was favorable to the USA (アメリカに有利な和解) [see newspaper front page title about the signing [調印すること] of the Paris Peace Accords (パリ協定(ベトナム和平)) in January 1973].
- [Note – 'Realpolitik' - 現実的政治 - 倫理またはイデオロギーの考慮よりも現実的なものに基づいた政治 (politics based on practical rather than moral or ideological considerations)].



- Secondly, the Sino-Soviet split [中ソ対立] and improved relations (関係の改善) between Washington (ワシントン) and Beijing (北京) could result in the US gaining a powerful ally (強大な同盟国を得ること) against Soviet influence (ソビエト影響に反対) in the world and particularly in East Asia. The US and the PRC [中華人民共和国] also agreed on the idea of a 'one China, but not now' policy (一つの中国の政策). [See 'Ping-Pong Diplomacy' picture - ピンポン外交とは、1971年(昭和46年)に日本の愛知県名古屋市で行われた第31回世界卓球選手権に、中華人民共和国(中国)が6年ぶりに出場し、大会終了後に中国がアメリカ合衆国など欧米の卓球選手を自国に招待したことを嚆矢とする米中間を中心とした一連の外交をいう。]
- In 1971, the US supported for Beijing's demand to officially seat (公式代表) PRC representatives (中国人民共和国の代表者) in the United Nations (国連). Resolution (決議) 2758 designated (指定されました) the PRC [中国人民共和国] as '*the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations*' [国連への中国の唯一の合法的代表], and controversially terminated (論争的に終了) Taiwan's full membership within the UN [台湾の国際連合への加盟] [see photo of PRC representatives (中国人民共和国の代表者) taking their UN seats (国連席) in October 1971].
- Mao and Zhou Enlai's deaths (毛沢東と周恩来の死) and then the rise to power (権力を握る) of the **pragmatist** (合理主義者) Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) meant both the PRC and the USA could finally **normalize** (正常化する) their relationship after nearly thirty years of **animosity** (敵意).
- On December 15th 1978, Washington (ワシントン) and Beijing (北京) announced the establishment of diplomatic relations (外交関係樹立) [中華人民共和国とアメリカ合衆国の外交関係樹立に関する共同コミュニケ] (see photo of Deng Xiaoping [鄧小平] and US President Jimmy Carter (ジミー・カーター米大統領) in January 1979).



Key Points:

- The negative consequences (悪い結果) of Mao Zedong's (毛沢東) economic, domestic, and foreign policies provided valuable lessons (貴重な教訓) for future Chinese leaders, particularly Deng Xiaoping [see photo] (the PRC's pragmatic (合理主義者) 'paramount leader' (最高指導者) from 1978 until 1992).
- The loss of its Soviet ally (ソ連の同盟国) during the years of the Sino-Soviet Split [中ソ対立], as well as the disastrous (壊滅的な) economic failure (経済失敗) of Mao's 'Great Leap Forward' [大躍進] (1958-1961) and the diplomatic isolation (外交的な孤立) created by the 'Cultural Revolution' [文化大革命] (1966 – 1976) pushed the PRC towards a rapprochement (和解) / 友好関係樹立) with the United States in the late 1960s.
- Washington (ワシントン), noticing an opportunity to weaken the communist bloc (共産圏 / 共産主義のブロックを弱体化する機会に気がついた), made peace overtures (講和を提議した) with Beijing (北京) in the late 1960s.
- Soviet influence in East Asia [東アジアのソビエト影響] was considerably weakened (弱体化した) as a result of Sino-US rapprochement [中国-US和解の結果として]. The result was a dramatic shift (劇的な変化) in the Cold War (冷戦) balance of power (勢力の均衡).
- The PRC's full membership of the United Nations [中華人民共和国の国際連合への加盟] and of the UN Security Council (UNSC) [国連安全保障理事会] after 1971 allowed communist China [共産主義の中国] to become an even greater political power in the world (政界の大物になった).

